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Abstract This paper provides an ethnographic understanding of harmony as language
policy in China, grounded in a historical analysis of ‘harmony’ (和 he) as a distinct
traditional Chinese (Confucian) ideal that gradually finds its new expressions through
the policy of Harmonious Society (和谐社会hexie shehui) in contemporary China. The
paper focuses on language practices surrounding ‘harmony’ emerging from the Internet,
a discursive space and site that is both highly diverse and heavily contested with respect
to policing processes, and notably so in the context of the PRC for its stringent mea-
surement of censorship and sensitization of language use. It is shown that although the
state is arguably the strongest stakeholder in implementing the policy of harmony, the
actual processes of harmonization online develop in detailed, multidirectional and
unpredictable rather than abstract, linear or monofocal ways. The paper offers a
descriptive analysis of the field of Internet memes that critique and subvert the policies
of harmonization. This includes newmeanings forwords (e.g. ‘harmony’ as euphemism
for censorship) and puns around the acoustic image of hexie and other censorablewords,
resulting in the circulation and bricolage of myths and songs revolving around ‘river
crab’ (hexie) and ‘grass mud horse’ (caonima) as placeholders of dissent, which feed
back into offline popular (and critical) culture. The paper concludes with a discussion of
the politics of harmony, pointing at the increasingly polycentric realities clashing with
themodernist monocentric ideal of the state project of harmony, andwith arguments for
an ethnographically based understanding and inspection of language policy as an
instrument for shaping sociolinguistic life.
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Introduction
Whereas language policy at the state or institutional level generally aims for the
ideal of harmony and social cohesion by emphasizing normativity and order,
everyday language practices at the ground level demonstrate far more features of
divergence, heterogeneity, and polycentricity. This is exceedingly so in view of the
current stage of globalization and its outcome of ‘superdiversity’ (Blommaert and
Rampton 2011). Digital mediascapes, for instance, open up a new, unprecedentedly
complex, and less controllable space in which effects of formal policies are
accompanied, de-centered, and transformed in a variety of sociolinguistic settings
(e.g. Pietika¨inen and Piirainen-Marsh 2009; Androutsopoulos and Juffermans 2014).
This raises the question of how harmony, or any state-sponsored social project, is
discursively negotiated and (co)constructed in and as social reality, as much as how
language policy and perhaps society at large may be better conceptualized and
understood when grounded in such reality.
The above observations are relevant to the current paper in two ways. On the one
hand, they raise broad concerns about language policy research as theory and
methodology, and they point us towards calls for a paradigmatic shift in this field
(Ricento 2006; Shohamy 2006; McCarty 2011; Davis 2014): from a traditional
focus on the formal policy (policy-as-text), often in the strict sense of the term, as a
set of official documents, directives, and regulations produced by authorities such as
the state, to a Hymesian (1980, 1996) ethnographic perspective to policy (policy-as-
discourse) as dynamic, multifaceted, and situated social practices. Following this
shift, and drawing on Foucault’s notion of police, disciplinary power, and
governmentality, Blommaert et al. (2009) suggest that language policy should be
seen in terms of ‘policing’, i.e. processes of rational production and management of
a normative structure that involves various sociopolitical actors and institutions with
unequally distributed agency. This locates language policy in complexes of
ideology and webs of cultural meanings and, as such, in constellations of micro-
discursive practices that are anchored in different and often conflictual ideologies,
indexical and constitutive of the macro-patterns of normativity and order. In such
constellations, the state functions as but one of a range of possible centers of norms.
On the other hand, the questions of harmony and language policy draw attention
to China as both a comparative context (to African and other contexts) and an
interesting case in its own right. Harmony and language policy go hand in hand in
China. Evolving from a well-entrenched classical Confucian ideal, ‘harmony’ has in
recent years become a proper name that stands for an explicit discourse on the
rationalization, maintenance, and enforcement of stability and order by the state in
reaction to the rapid economic-political changes and sociocultural diversifications
resulting from the country’s modernization and globalization processes. This can be
seen in the prevalent slogan of Harmonious Society championed by former
President Hu Jintao. Not only the formal policies of language—which advocates a
monoglot standard ideology (cf. Silverstein 1996)—but almost all recent official
policies in China, have invariably adopted the state motif of ‘harmony’. This has
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impacts on the way language and communication ‘ought to’ be and are actually
practiced in (at least) the public sphere in China, including in its flourishing online
environment. Harmony, therefore, is a crucial aspect and driving force of language
policy and policing in the context of China.
This paper seeks an ethnographic understanding of harmony via and, thus, as
language policy in China. As stated, we use ethnography in the Hymesian sense as a
theoretical perspective rather than a mere method of social and linguistic inquiry. In
this we follow Lillis’s (2008) discussion of three levels of ethnography, i.e. a first
and minimal level of ethnography conceived as talk around texts, a second level as
full-fledged methodology comprising multiple data sources and a sustained and
interactive engagement in the contexts of production and the communities of
practice, and a third and deeper level of ethnography as interpretive theorizing (cf.
Blommaert 2005; Rampton 2007). These three levels of ethnography progressively
narrow the ontological gap between text and context in literacy research and
discourse analysis more generally. Our use of ethnography needs to be appreciated
at this third and deeper level, i.e. as an ethnographic-sociolinguistic study of
harmony as a complex object of analysis.
In what follows, we begin with a historical analysis of ‘harmony’ as a distinct
traditional Chinese ideal that gradually finds its new expressions through policy in
contemporary China. We will then focus on language practices surrounding
‘harmony’ emerging from the Internet in China, a discursive space and site of
policing that is highly diverse while also heavily contested and policed through
stringent measurement of censorship and sensitization of communication (e.g. Tsui
2003; Yang 2009; MacKinnon 2011). From this perspective of the Internet, we will
show empirically that although the state is arguably the strongest stakeholder in
implementing the policy of harmony—or, better, harmonization—the actual
processes of harmonization through policing online develop in detailed, multidi-
rectional, and unpredictable rather than abstract, linear, or monofocal ways. The
outcomes of such processes are, paradoxically, alternative ideologies of harmony as
well as non-normative use of language. We will discuss the implications of these
observations and our understanding of harmony as language policy—with reference
to China and Chinese—in the final part of the paper.
Harmony as a Confucian ideal
‘Harmony’ originates from he (和),1 a word celebrated byChinese people as one of the
core symbols of their cultural essence, alongside words such as ‘fortune’, ‘longevity’,
and ‘luck’. It is important tomake clear at the onset thatwhenwe speak of harmony in a
Chinese context, the use of the term conjures up a distinctive ideological load seated in
over two millennia of Chinese history and Confucian traditions.
1 The key Chinese terms and expressions in this paper are written in italicized Pinyin, the official
phonetic system based on the standard Chinese variety of Putonghua for transcribing Hanzi (Chinese
characters) in the People’s Republic of China. Forms of Hanzi are offered when a terminology appears for
the first time and/or for the purpose of clarification. Tone markers of Pinyin are shown only when they are
relevant to the analysis.
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He is one of the central tenets of the Confucian system of ethical philosophy and
political governmentality (cf. Yao 2000). The Confucian doctrines of he are
incorporated by generations of Chinese in conceptualizing norms and orders that
inform individual behaviors in relation to the moral self, the family, the state, and other
levels of society. In this sense,he represents a specific set of historically enregistered and
internalized discourses about what is meant by harmony, why harmony is important,
and how to achieve it socially and politically. This is a crucial point for understanding
the significance of harmony in terms of (language) policy in China today.
Although today he is invariably credited to Confucianism, its genesis predates
Confucius (551–479 BCE). Li (2006), for instance, traces its existence back to as far as
the earliest dynasties of Shang (sixteenth–eleventh century BCE) and Zhou (1066–256
BCE). He observes that the concept gradually evolved from its initial meaning of
describing how different sounds or flavors respond to one another in ancient music and
food rituals, to an aesthetical, ethical, philosophical, political, and metaphysical ideal
that embraces harmony as the optimal way of constructing society and cosmos (Li
2006). It is believed that Confucius was the first to synthesize earlier thoughts about
harmony and placed he at the centre of his philosophy. The previously variegated ideas
were quoted and appropriated byConfucius and his followers to promote the social and
political significance of harmony. He was held as ‘the highest ideal’ (Li 2006:588) of
what was later to become Confucianism, one of the most influential thoughts and
cultural traditions in China (and other Asian-Confucian societies).
What is interesting about harmony, according to Li (2006, 2008) and others, are
the distinctions and dynamics between sameness and difference it defines. In the
Confucian classics The Analects, he was a crucial criterion for junzi (the real
gentleman)—junzi he er butong, xiaoren tong er buhe (‘The junzi harmonizes but
does not seek sameness, whereas [an unscrupulous man] seeks sameness but does
not harmonize’, Li 2006:586). He er butong (harmony with distinction) is a popular
saying people still use today to defend their stance and settle disputes. What is
inscribed in these lines is the differentiation between harmony and sameness,
between valid harmony based on the acknowledgement of difference versus
sameness, and invalid harmony, based on the diminishing of difference; it also states
the moral-ethical categorizations of harmony for which the order of good and bad,
appropriate and inappropriate, is negotiated and established.
Such dynamics are crucial to the understanding of he. He does not equal tong
(sameness), even though sameness is an important ingredient of harmony and must
be valued and maintained ‘at an appropriate level’ (Li 2006:590). Not any kind of
sameness leads to harmony. Li contends that the Confucian belief rejects the ‘over-
presence’ of sameness and deems it as being in danger of imposing uniformity and
disharmony. Difference, on the other hand, is a precondition and cornerstone of
harmony because he is essentially about the harmonious, appropriate interplays of
differences. Harmony presupposes the entailment of difference as tension, conflict,
and ‘strife’: the process through which harmony is negotiated and sought. As Li
(2006:592) argues, ‘harmony is not only a state but, more importantly, a process,
disharmony is necessarily present during the process of harmonization’.
X. Wang et al.
123
Hence he entails hexie (harmony), heping (peace) and hejie (reconciliation), an
equilibrium that is only acceptable and appropriate through strife and the
harmonization of sameness and difference—managed diversity, so to speak. This
includes the management of different roles and the knowledge of ‘ought-ness’ of
behaviours based on the roles one assumes in society—what is called ‘rites’ or li
(礼) in Confucianism. Li refers not only to ceremonial rituals performed on specific
occasions, it is one of the five basic virtues (i.e. benevolence, righteousness,
propriety, wisdom, and trustworthiness) in the Confucian ethics, and is deemed ‘the
way of humanity and the way of Heaven’ (Li 2006:588), of behaving oneself as well
as managing society.
Harmony operates on five hierarchically interrelated scale-levels (Li 2008). On
the elementary level is the individual-personal awareness and desire to self-cultivate
one’s internal harmonization as a moral duty to the keeping of order in society; this
is the foundation of a moral society. The second level concerns ‘a nexus of human
relationship’ (Li 2008:429), namely, the five major interpersonal/ethical relation-
ships in which the individual self exists: between ruler and minister, parent and
child, husband and wife, or between siblings, and between friends. The next level of
harmony is to do with the governance politics of the state. Harmonious governance
is to bring about order in society through the virtuous functioning of government
officials rather than penal laws. The fourth level involves promoting harmony as
peaceful coexistence beyond the state borders, in the world. And finally, at the most
fundamental level, harmony is applicable as a universal law and a cosmological
order generated by the interactive process of balancing human, nature, and society.
The ultimate goal is to realize taihe (grand harmony) throughout the cosmos, which
derives from harmony at the lower levels.
Harmony, thus, is a carefully constructed normative complex in Confucianism
that relies on the cultivation of prescribed virtues and maintenance of morality and
ethics. It provides an early model of humanist ideal of organizing life at multiple
levels and achieving desired balance and order. To this end, differences and
conflicts are regulated and controlled, through strife between individuality and
collectiveness, by means of stipulated norms and rules.
Returning to the issue of policy and policing, it is not difficult to see that the
Confucian ideal of harmony, especially with a long historical trajectory of being the
state-sponsored political and ethical system since Emperor Han Wudi’s rule (156–
87 BCE), can function as a coercive force on people’s perceptions about ‘how to be’
or ‘how to act’ and the normative organization of society. This ideal, as we will see
next, is continuously intertextualized, updated, and reinvented—eventually, estab-
lished as policy—in tune with the development of a modern China.
The reinvention of harmony
As already mentioned, ‘harmony’ or hexie (和谐) has recently become a prominent
discourse pattern in China, embodied in pervasive expressions like Harmonious
Society initiated by the government. If one travels to China nowadays, one would
find an overwhelming presence of the word hexie in the public sphere: on the TV, in
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newspapers, on public transport, in classrooms and offices, and on street billboards
and banners. Blommaert’s (2010:142ff) insightful account of the ‘harmonious golf’
sign in a Beijing street, about how the national political slogan of harmony is
superimposed onto the global corporate discourse of golf, offers a poignant
example.
This is an arduous comeback of Confucianism after its marginalization in China
since the early twentieth century. This return signals a discursive shift centering
upon the Confucian ‘jargon’ of harmony, the revamping and redeploying of which
reflect the state attempts to establish new orders as its engagement with
globalization processes deepens. Harmony, in this sense, serves as a strong
contemporary rhetoric that dominates the order of meaning making in China, as
seen e.g. in the official policy of ‘language harmony’ (yuyan hexie).
Understanding the discourse of harmony in China’s language policy certainly
benefits from insights into the philosophical-epistemic dimension of he embedded in
the Confucian traditions (as examined above). Meanwhile, this understanding needs
to be situated in the present framework of talking and behaving that is emerging
under/in the name of hexie in response to processes of globalization. To establish
this framework is to further investigate the social–historical dimension of hexie in
which harmony is a discourse of cultural and philosophical tradition as well as an
indicator of wider social and political changes in the light of China’s modernization
and globalization. We will see that hexie involves considerable discursive shifts, not
just a reactivation of he.
New Confucianism
The discursive shifts of hexie are by no means random. This becomes clear when we
consider it as part of the successive discursive shifts about Confucianism unfolded
over the course of the last century. Prior to that, Confucianism stayed more or less
as a stable, mainstream value system in a largely enclosed Chinese society since the
Han Dynasty. The downfall of the last monarchy Qing and the incoming of Western
ideologies, such as capitalism, liberalism, and communism in the early 1900s,
effectively ended the orthodoxy of Confucianism in China. A new generation of
intellectuals emerging from the May Fourth movement (ca. 1919) denounced the
hegemony centuries’ political manipulations of Confucianism had exerted, espe-
cially over the equality, freedom, and creativity of women and youth. Having said
that, a total breakaway and disregard of Confucianism, at least of its emblematic and
intellectual values, also provoked devastating identity dilemmas for a newborn
nation-state. In fact, Confucianism was never far off the scene. As Dirlik (1995:234)
asserts, ‘These same intellectuals [who decried Confucianism] would, in ensuing
years, engage in efforts to find some reconciliation between “Western” and
“Chinese” values, out of which would emerge what has come to be called “New
Confucianism”’.
New Confucianism is an umbrella term that captures the ongoing neo-
conservative transformation and reinvention of the Confucian traditions over the
past decades, of which three generations of exponents have developed (Makeham
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2003; Fan 2011). Over these generations, the status, focus, and impact of
Confucianism shifted with the ebb and flow of economic and political conditions
(Dirlik 1995; Bell 2006; Louie 2011). In a nutshell, the first generation (1921–1949)
of the three returned to Confucianism in search for a sense of self from within a
crisis-ridden China, amidst desires to depart from its condemned ‘feudal’ past. The
second one (1950–1979) was led by scholars outside Mainland China which was
then occupied by the Cultural Revolution and the consequent ideological distancing
from Confucianism in favour of Maoist communism and nationalism. This period
was engaged mainly in dialogues between Oriental-Chinese Confucianism and
Western-Kantian philosophy. The most recent decades (1980–present) saw a pan-
China ‘rediscovery’ of Confucianism (Bell 2006) accompanying the East Asian
economic booms in the 1980s, as—not so much its content, but—‘the evaluation of
that content with respect to the question of modernity’ had changed (Dirlik
1995:236). In this newest wave of Confucianism, China reemerged as its center and
leading advocate, while embarking on the post-Mao ‘reform and opening-up’ course
and reengaging with wider processes of globalization. It is this third phase of
Confucianist ‘renaissance’ (Fan 2011) that gives rise to the current political
discourse of harmony.
The harmonious society
China’s reengagement with globalization since 1978 has hugely enhanced the
country’s economic-political power and, consequently, its social diversification and
restratification. China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and in merely
10 years, its GDP had increased almost five times and it became the second-largest
economy in the world. Notwithstanding, the inequality of wealth in China is also
growing at an alarming speed, with its Gini coefficient index reaching 0.73 in 2012.2
Reclaiming and revaluing Confucianism under such conditions becomes once again
necessary and all the more important. For one thing, it reasserts the part of the
cultural and national identity that China had been alienated from under the
dominance of imported ideologies and self-inflicted disruptions. For another, this re-
forges a domestic political-ideological framework that can appeal to nationalistic
nostalgia and, at the same time, reestablish order in a rapidly changing and
restructuring society. It is in such a context that the Chinese government initiated
the latest wave of New Confucianism by reintroducing hexie as the spearhead
jargon, calling into question the need of a new order legitimatized by redeploying
Confucianism.
Harmonious Society (和谐社会 hexie shehui) was first put forth in September
2004, when former President Hu Jintao gave a speech on ‘building a harmonious
socialist society’ at the fourth plenary session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of
the Communist Party of China. This was propounded in the following year when
2 The Gini coefficient index measures income inequality, with \0.25 generally considered the most
equal and[0.6 the most unequal; 0.4 is the internationally recognized warning line. See People’s Daily
article ‘Report Suggests Top 1 % Families Own Over 1/3 of The Country’s Wealth’ (http://society.people.
com.cn/n/2014/0725/c1008-25345140.html).
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CPC’s sixth plenary session passed the strategic document of ‘Chinese Communist
Party Central Committee’s Resolution on Major Issues of Building a Socialist
Harmonious Society’. According to President Hu, a harmonious society is ‘a
scientific development concept’ consisting of six elements: democratic rule of law,
fairness and justness, honesty and friendliness, vitality and liveliness, stability and
orderliness, and coexistence of man and nature. It is urged that a harmonious, i.e.
orderly, political environment and social structure with regained morale are needed
in China to address the deepening social divide, discontents, and tensions, as well as
to fill the perceived ideological and ‘moral vacuum’ left by the Cultural Revolution
(Louie 2011).
Harmonious Society bespeaks an effort in building a culturalist-humanist image
of the state by re-cherishing the core Chinese values encoded in the Confucian
concept of hexie while turning it into a new rhetoric ‘to react and redress an
increasingly less balanced and less fair domestic landscape’ (Yu 2008:123) and,
ultimately, to reassert the state’s authority. In this context, hexie becomes a
metonym for a self-defendable form of power and coercion that imposes certain
order and normativity. This recentering of harmony, as we will see next, is also
reflected in the way language policy in China has been (re)formulated and
expanded, incorporating hexie as a major trope and motif.
Language harmony
The monoglot standard of Putonghua and its hegemonic dominance over other
Chinese varieties has evolved out of sociohistorical practices (Dong 2010) and
can thus be seen as a continual process of harmonization in the sense of
Confucianism. The hierarchical order as harmony in the domain of language use
is made more transparent and justifiable as it merges with the political discourse
of social harmony in recent years. This merge is illustrated in the official poster
used in 2009 for the twelfth annual National Putonghua Promotion Week
organized by the Chinese National Commission on Language and Script Work
(see Figure 1).
In this poster, the layers of significance of harmony are semiotized in: (a) hexie as
an oversized word placed in the top-center, announcing the theme of the state-led
language campaign; (b) the recursive pattern of hexie as the background, inscribed
in the calligraphic font ‘seal’ (zhuan, originated from the Confucian period over
2000 years ago) and written vertically—an aesthetic and archaic organization of
semiotic features indexing hexie’s historical and cultural roots—which frames the
poster as well as, symbolically, the language campaign; and (c) two sentences that
spell out the updated (sociolinguistic) meaning of hexie in modern-day China: ‘love
the motherland language and script; build a harmonious language life’.
Government propaganda like this has been in practice ever since the founding of
the PRC to install a monoglossic order in society. This order is not only about which
language varieties are more prestigious than others (e.g. Putonghua compared to
dialect or other languages), but also about the different and unequal degrees of
legitimacy and authenticity certain language variety as social capital may have (or
not) to afford people voice (X. Wang 2012). Regulation of language is regulation of
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voice (Blommaert 2005; Juffermans and Van der Aa 2013), thus, a form of policing
through formal policy. The first language law passed in China in 2000, the Law on
the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese, is an example and also a pretext of the
Harmonious Society discourse that followed a few years later.
What can be seen in the above poster is that the policy of a monoglossic order is
being relabelled with hexie, an ideal that emphasizes order and normativity as
appropriateness by virtue, and, thus, becomes a bone ﬁde voice. Such a voice is
further sanctioned by the nationalist sentiment (the call to love the motherland
language and script) aroused by Confucianism from which hexie originates, and is
seen as iconic of Chinese history and culture (the archaic styling of the word hexie).
Any voice implying an alternative, heteroglossic order is, hence, against harmony
and morally inappropriate, and may be regarded as an act of disharmonization and
subversion.
Sociolinguists in China (e.g. Feng 2007; Zhou 2006; Zhang and Xie 2010) also
argue that maintaining harmony in language use is an indispensable aspect of
Figure 1 Harmony: Love the motherland language and script; build a harmonious language life (poster
of the 2009 National Putonghua Promotion Week)
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constructing a harmonious society. They reason that the realization of language
harmony relies on people’s awareness of the norms of conduct and willingness and
‘sensibility’ in conforming to such norms (Feng and Zhang 2006). It is suggested
that nonstandard, non-normative, and innovative uses of language across domains,
such as commercial language, literary works, and online communication, all risk
violating and harming linguistic and social harmony (Feng 2007). Following this
logic, harmony has to do as much with self-compliance of normalization as with
top-down policing and active interventions of state power.
So far, we have discussed the notion of ‘harmony’ with respect to he, in the
classical Confucian sense, and hexie, in its evolvement into a political discourse
through the reinvention of Confucianism in China. Taken together, these provide
ethnographic contextualizations necessary for us to dissect the meanings of
harmony as observable texts and practices in China. In the following section, we
examine harmony as processes of policing in China’s virtual space. We will
demonstrate that, alongside the state policing, there are considerable non-state-
oriented interactions and influences from grassroots users of the Internet. Such
practices imply that ‘language harmony’ is not only about policies and legislations
of language per se, but more about the policing of voice and the validity of using
certain linguistic features to express oneself.
The (dis)harmonious Chinese Internet
Recent development of digital technologies in China has created the world’s largest
population of Internet users, or ‘netizens’. According to the latest report by China
Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC, http://www1.cnnic.cn/AU/MediaC/
rdxw/2014/201407/t20140723_47471.htm), the government agency responsible for
Internet affairs, in 2014 China’s netizens exceeded 632 million (compared to 60
million in 2002), with the Internet penetration rate reaching 46.9 %. In addition,
‘Emerging mobile applications [… alongside traditional PC] have met the
requirements for Internet access in an all-around way and facilitated full network-
based life of Internet users.’ The sociopolitical implications of this are immense
regardless of the still unequal distribution of digital infrastructure and the urban–
rural divide.
The Internet has profoundly transformed the way people access information and
communicate. It offers unprecedented potential of freedom and democracy to
authoritarian states and exposes its citizens to alternative norms, values, and
resources that were unavailable before. With the new technology, the speed and
velocity of such changes are extraordinary, posing new challenges to the existing
social order. One of the main challenges is related to superdiversity—new forms of
diversity that make use of the Internet either as a space and medium of production,
or as a tool for inventing new resources of meaning making (e.g. Varis and Wang
2011; X. Wang 2012; Velghe 2014). What’s more, the Internet allows wider, more
active and democratic participation in economic and sociopolitical discussions and
public civic life at the grassroots level (Zhou 2005; Yang 2009). In the case of
China, however, all of these may interfere or even endanger the building of a
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harmonious society in the eyes of the state. Not only may online communication
dispute the state prerogative of defining practices of meaning making, it also
decreases the exclusive power of state control and opens various aspects of social
and political issues for negotiation and debate.
Online policing and harmonization
Structuring and maintaining virtual order is, therefore, on the top of the agenda for
constructing and reinforcing language harmony in China. Devising and implement-
ing Internet censorship policies have been a vigorous and sometimes aggressive way
of policing and controlling online behaviors (Varis et al. 2010). For instance, in
addition to language rules, such as the Language Law of 2000, it is common
practice to use automatic screen-masking to block ‘disharmonious’ language use—
ranging from profanity to politically sensitive words or topics—by substituting with
asterisks or deleting it altogether. Sometimes an entire webpage or website is
removed. The government also contrives a system that inflicts self-monitoring
online. CNNIC issues new legislations almost every year regarding the management
of Internet Protocol addresses in order to accurately track the activities of individual
end users online. The panoptic surveillance measures are conjointly carried out by
the Internet police (see Figure 2) who inspect and enforce judicial punishment
against ‘disharmonious’ behaviors. The law enforcement and policing online began
in 2003 when the Ministry of Public Security launched the massive Golden Shield
censorship project, known as the Great Firewall of China.
Figure 2 Internet police in China (http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/from-china-to-the-uk-net-
censorship-worldwide-622428)
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In a blog entitled ‘25 Shocking Facts about Chinese Censorship’, Wilkins (2009)
lists all of the above and other measurements, including the use of spyware and the
ban of transnational social networks such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook, in
order to censor and control what is happening on the Internet in China. It is widely
reported in the international media, such as the New York Times, the Guardian, and
alike, that the Internet censorship in China is the most stringent in the world. In
China, more people are employed by the government to monitor and ‘guide’ online
conducts, such as the notorious 50 Cents Party (wumao dang) who are allegedly
paid at the rate of half a yuan per post to write as so-called grassroots netizens, and
to steer public opinions into a ‘harmonious’ direction. When Christine Lagarde, the
head of the International Monetary Fund, decided to charm China by appearing on
its most popular social media Sina Weibo during her official visit to China in
November 2011, she was instantly cautioned by a netizen named Damo Duhang,
‘Please be careful to write! Here is not France. If your word is sensitive, someone
would hexie you’ (Chin 2011).
While the state doctrine of Harmonious Society is used as a mandate to justify the
control of communication and the quashing of ‘disharmonious’ speech online, the
word hexie has turned into a satirical placeholder for the domineering maintenance
of social stability and political order. Netizens started using hexie as a euphemism
for Internet censorship. When they say that a user is ‘harmonized’, the suggestion is
that the person has somehow been brought into compliance by government agency,
whether by physical force or by losing access to his/her account. By appropriating
this word, netizens voice criticism of claims that state-imposed censorship is the
means to build a ‘harmonious society’. This attitude is illustrated in a widely
circulated picture online, which shows the word 和諧 (hexie), in traditional
characters, with the radicals 口 (mouth) all being plastered over (see Figure 3).
Through this image, netizens argue that harmony is in fact a policing strategy
adopted by the authorities to muzzle them, to silence their voices.
Hexie, river crab, and caonima
The parody of ‘harmony’ has, ironically, turned the word itself into a so-called
sensitive word, an object of policing. When the word hexie begot censored and
‘harmonized’ online, netizens adopted a new word, ‘river crab’ (河蟹), to replace
Figure 3 Hexie with no ‘mouth’ (http://webfee.blogspot.com/2011/10/blog-post_30.html)
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the direct use of ‘harmony’, since these two words are tonologically different
homophones: héxié for ‘harmony’, and héxiè for ‘river crab’. Images of river crabs
are shared online to express discontent with the state censorship and suppression of
free speech (see Figure 4). Soon, ‘river crab’ became a ‘meme’ (an Internet
buzzword) that symbolizes, euphemistically, the ideological battle between
‘harmonization’ and ‘counter-harmonization’ in China’s cyberspace.
The move from héxié 和谐 to héxiè 河蟹 indicates an extraordinary effect of
policing. Rather than uniformity and loss of voice, the enforcement of language
harmony online has stimulated and facilitated new forms of (super)diversity and
new opportunities and ways of self-articulation. This is important to our
understanding of language policy as ethnographically informed processes of
policing. Even though harmony and Internet censorship are forcefully implemented
as top-down policy, this policy is being negotiated and resisted by the subordinate
group and their individual agency, leading to oppositional responses and unexpected
outcomes.
To illustrate this point, we turn to another well-known Internet phenomenon
since 2009: a ‘modern myth’ (Hopkins 2011) about ‘river crab’ fighting ‘grass mud
horse’—another Internet meme created by netizens. ‘Grass-mud horse’ comes from
căonímă 草泥马, a seemingly innocent nonsense word. However, it is a carefully
invented homophone (again with different tones) of another harmonizable
expression, càonĭmā 肏你妈, which means ‘fuck your mother’. Although the
Chinese censorship system aims to curb obscene use of language, the pun effect of
caonima enables netizens to transgress while satirizing the policy with impunity.
This eventually makes the word an icon of grassroots aspirations for freedom of
speech. Netizens even designed a written form for this three-character-phrase, by
combining elements of each of the three characters草,泥 and马 (see Figure 5). As
a netizen named Kenneth Tan explains, ‘The 艹 radical refers to ‘grass’ (草), 尼
resembles 泥 and both are homophones, while 马 is the character for ‘horse’. The
new character even has a recommended pronunciation jiàyú’.
Figure 4 River crab on the national flag (https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/ln62-netspeak/)
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Initially, caonima became popularized for being a clever euphemism of a
swearing word that can escape the touch of harmonization/censorship. But, over
time, it took on a whole new life beyond this function. A mythical animal depicted
as a furry, amiable-looking alpaca was created to give a physical embodiment to the
‘grass mud horse’, a previously nonexistent creature, and it started roaming on the
Internet. Furthermore, a story was invented and circulated, telling that the magical
beast lives in the ‘Ma-le Gobi’ desert (mălègēbì 马勒戈壁) and feeds on ‘fertile
grass’ (wòcăo 沃草). Although the environment in Ma-le Gobi is extremely harsh,
the grass mud horse lives a happy life there. But one day, the river crab
(symbolizing harmonization/censorship) moves into Ma-le Gobi. The grass mud
horse and the river crab have a fierce fight and, finally, the grass mud horse wins the
battle and goes on living in the fantasy land of Ma-le Gobi thereafter (see Figure 6).
The story (with several slightly varied versions) is a dramatic elaboration of
resistance against Internet policing by Chinese netizens. One might argue that the
protagonist, the grass mud horse, represents the repressed, and the river crab
represents the repressor. The use of stories becomes here the ‘hidden transcript’
(Scott 1990) of public political discourse, by developing euphemistic lexicons,
images, and narratives through which language use and meaning making are coded
in such a way that they are recognized and shared by subordinate groups, but lie
beyond or beneath the patrol and surveillance of the authority. These can be
understood in terms of ‘metro-practices’ (Arnaut 2012), acts of communication or
identity that travel underground, below the radar of panoptical governmentality.
Both ‘Ma-le Gobi’ and ‘fertile grass’ are such examples: the former is the
homophone of the Chinese vulgar expression mālegèbī 妈了个屄 (your mother’s
vagina), and the latter is that of wŏcào 我肏 (I fuck). In using extreme profanity,
subversive puns, as well as the metaphorical plot of the grass mud horse defeating
the river crab, netizens are able to utter deep resentment and symbolic defiance of
China’s Internet censorship and figuratively enact the struggles through a fantasy
drama of war. The triumph was celebrated across the Internet and spawned
reproductions in more vivid forms of language online.
One such example is an online video called ‘the song of caonima’ which went
viral after its release in 2009. The song (again with a few versions) features a digital
Figure 5 ‘Grass mud horse’: a
new Chinese character (http://
shanghaiist.com/2009/03/23/
character_of_the_day.php)
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voice of a children’s chorus singing about the life of the grass mud horse in the
theme tune of the famous cartoon series The Smurfs, as if to highlight the cuddly
creature’s decency, innocence, and vitality. In one of the versions published on
YouTube (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkx1aenjk08), the song lyrics are
subtitled in English as follows:
There is a herd of Grass Mud Horses (fuck your mom)
Who live in the MaLe Desert (your mother’s cunt)
They are lively and intelligent
They are fun-loving and nimble
They live freely in the MaLe desert (your mother’s cunt)
They are courageous, tenacious, and overcome the difficult environment
Oh, lying down Grass Mud Horse (Oh, fuck your mother!!!)
Oh, running wild Grass Mud Horse (Oh, fuck your mother, hard!!!!)
They defeated the River Crabs (censorship) in order to protect their grassland
(free speech)
River Crabs (censorship) disappeared from the MaLe Gobi Desert forever!!!
The infectiously funny yet perplexingly distorted digital productions, such as
this, suggest powerful yet humorous attacks against the harmonization force. The
central narrative about caonima as feisty survivors and warriors who fight bravely
against invaders to protect their scarce resources is, in fact, a hidden political dissent
and activism through language violence against harmony-as-hegemony.
Figure 6 ‘Grass mud horse’ swallowing ‘river crab’ (http://kahnlei.blog.sohu.com/147096077.html)
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This kind of struggles extends even beyond the Internet, as the image of caonima
goes offline, enters the corporeal world, and is turned into consumable goods and
identity statements in popular culture (see Figure 7).
Not only has caonima been transformed into a new cultural product of online
spoofs (Meng 2011) and symbolic interactions (S. Wang 2012) for mass
consumption, it goes on to expand deeper into Chinese society and becomes an
exploitable material with multiple meanings that inspires and provokes a more
explicitly ‘disharmonious’ democratic movement, notably by public intellectuals.
For instance, the Chinese artist and dissident Ai Weiwei makes himself a leading
actor of this movement by posting photo images of himself, posing naked with only
a small furry caonima doll blocking or ‘harmonizing’ his genitals. This is highly
controversial not least because of the public display of nudity (which has led to
criminal accusations of ‘pornography’ against Ai Weiwei): the composition of these
images comes with a highly offensive caption which rests on the pun between ‘grass
mud horse covering the middle’ (căonímă dăngzhōngyāng 草泥马挡中央) and
‘fuck your mother the Central Party’ (càonĭmā dăngzhōngyāng 肏你妈党中央).
This visual and semiotic reframing of caonima further broadens the sociolinguistic
repertoire of the word and makes it a transparent symbol of ridicule and contempt
over the control of Internet communication imposed from the above—as depicted in
a cartoon impression of Ai Weiwei’s act of art by the Chicago artist Tom Tian (see
Figure 8). By leaping over the heads of the police, a naked Ai Weiwei, with one
hand shielding himself with the grass mud horse and the other raised in a fist high in
the air, shows ultimate condemnation, rebellion, and subversion against the
hegemony of harmony exercised by the authority.
Figure 7 Caonima T-shirt and toys (http://www.gxyin.com/ShowNews.aspx?id=569)
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Discussion
From hexie to caonima, what we have is a complex story about harmony and
harmonization, Internet censorship, hegemony and suppression, resistance and
struggle, semiotic innovation and digital creativity from the Chinese cyberspace (cf.
Nie 2009). In the name of traditionalism and nationalism represented (selectively) by
the Confucian ideal of harmony, the state is keenly restructuring order and rebalancing
social disparity while maintaining an authoritarian system. This ambition of harmony
inevitably leads to the ‘harmonization’, namely, coercion and even denial, of diversity
and individual voice which are enhanced by the Internet as a new social arena and new
package of resources for constructing alternative identities. The Chinese Internet
censorship is a new and overt form of policing in response to this phenomenon of
globalization. Nevertheless, it is challenged from below.
The above discussions illustrate how innovative manipulations of linguistic,
semiotic, and literacy resources via computer-mediated communication creates a new
genre of protest and contention throughwhich the process of state policing is sabotaged
and challenged. The invention of ‘river crab’ and ‘grassmud horse’, together with their
associated lexicons, images, puns, and stories, relies on the sophisticated interplay of
visual, verbal, and symbolic texts capable of expressingmultiple meanings through the
same form. This transformation of language function is made possible by the
infrastructure of the Internet and is propagated and transmitted from online to offline,
making thesewords a socially recognizable and ‘enregistered’ (Agha 2005) set of codes
Figure 8 Ai Weiwei with
caonima (http://www.tomtian.
com/#s=2&mi=2&pt=1&pi=
10000&p=4&a=0&at=0)
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that offer semiotic, aesthetic, symbolic, and political capitals, thus, allowing Chinese
netizens to develop their own voices in the presence of tough policy.
Subversive Internet memes like the ones examined here are an important and
distinctive part of micro-politics that ‘takes advantage of unique possibilities of the
Chinese language, as well as the technological possibilities of the Internet’ (Hopkins
2011). Although memes tend to be contingent, unstable, and temporary—also
depending on the extent of policing—their instant usability and trendiness can
appeal to mass audiences and can therefore potentially generate mass campaigns
against censorship (or other forms of) policing through fast, informal, micro
language transgression. The word hexie offers a good example of how ‘harmony’ is
turned on its own head and changed from a symbol of policing and homogenization
to that of contention and counter-homogenization, totally opposite to what it was
intended to mean by the authorities. It spawns a string of new memes, all of which
are developed into codes with multiple functions that can be used and appropriated
in various settings and environments as anti-policing instruments.
Thus, ironically, in the process of harmonization, ‘harmony’ has caused a wave
of ‘disharmonious’ behavior and noise. Such politics of (dis)harmony on the
Internet can be taken as an indication of super-diversification of voices.
Nevertheless, what seems a semiotic carnival drawing wide participation in a
range of formats can only momentarily escape the control and inhibition of the state
power. According to Global Voices (a multilingual community of bloggers who
report about citizen media stories from around the world), as a consequence of its
popularity, the online appearance of hexie and caonima is officially suspended, and
a notification to the Chinese forum managers about the policy banishing of these
words is repeatedly tweeted (see Figure 9).
Policing seems omnipresent, but so do phenomena of hexie and caonima. The
banality of power (Mbembe 1992) in the name of harmony already presupposes the
existence of disharmony. The question to ask, then, is ‘not whether the Internet will
democratize China, but rather in what ways the Internet is democratizing (or will
democratize) communication in China’ (Tai 2006:184).
Figure 9 “One shouldn’t promote any content related with grass mud horse” (http://globalvoicesonline.
org/2009/03/18/china-goodbye-grass-mud-horse/)
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Conclusions
This paper has reviewed the genesis of ‘harmony’, a state-political term in China
from its early philosophical sources to its contemporary deployment as a tool for
social ordering. Harmony, as we have seen, was never an unambiguous concept and
has always been contested, remodelled, and challenged, by means of shifts in the
intertextual links of the concept. In this sense, harmony joins political core terms
such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’ and so forth: semantic floaters that,
when used skilfully, can stand for entirely different realities. As Bolinger (1971)
argued long time ago, the ‘pure’ or ‘original’ semantics of a term can never stand for
the total array of its actual forms of usage. Word meanings per se are poor indicators
of the actual life of words in human social and cultural practice.
We are now in a position to formulate two sets of concluding reflections. First,
we will extract some general points from our earlier analysis and look at what this
tells us about harmony as larger patterns of political and ideological struggles.
Secondly, some general observations can be made regarding the nature of language
policy and language policy research.
We have seen that the intensive use of the term ‘harmony’ in contemporary
China is guided by a desire, or demand, for social order. This demand appears to be
spurred by the accelerating social differentiation in the PRC in the wake of its rise to
global economic prominence. With the emergence of a sizeable professional middle
class and a smaller (nevertheless important) class of super-rich people (e.g. Tomba
2009), China is rapidly becoming a class-stratified society characterized by
inequalities between rich and poor. This is accompanied by the availability of new
information and ideas and new opportunities and resources for identity making
provided by the Internet.
It is in the context of such escalating social and political divide that ‘harmony’
must be seen and understood: it is a slogan that responds to the rapid fragmentation
and diversification in society by putting some ‘spin’ on it: in spite of such growing
diversities, the Chinese must have a common focus and invest themselves into a
project of social cohesion and ‘harmony’. This concern with ‘harmony’ is, thus, an
attempt towards re-emphasizing the modernist monocentric ideal inscribed in the
state structure of China. Harmony should produce, legitimatize, and enforce
centripetal forces in society and politics, and prevent society from spinning out of
control.
This, as we have seen, does not always work according to plans. The monocentric
orientation of ‘harmony’ clashes with the increasing polycentricity in Chinese
society, with escalating social, cultural, and political fragmentation—an increasing
divergence of values, opinions, and other objects of ‘ideology’. The Internet is a
carrier for such accelerating forms of polycentricity, and we have shown some of
the many ways in which Chinese netizens address, in practice, the state’s and their
own understandings of harmony. The Internet, obviously, is a platform not just for
centripetal forces in society but also (and perhaps more so) for centrifugal forces,
forces that take subjects out of the monocentric orbit of the state. This tension
between a centripetal and monocentric social politics, and a centrifugal and
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polycentric potential afforded through the Internet, is well understood by the
Chinese authorities, and could be at the core of the state’s attempts to monitor and
constrain Internet use. Similar reactions against the ‘chaotic’ dimensions of the
Internet by the state can be observed elsewhere too; think of the knee-jerk reactions
by several Western states when WikiLeaks started publishing previously confiden-
tial documents.
The future of ‘harmony’ as a useful concept in Chinese politics will depend on
the way in which it can be deployed as a ‘niched’, non-totalizing concept targeted at
the policing and regulation of certain aspects of social life. If it is applied to the
totality of social life, it will backfire, because it is an inadequate descriptor of social
processes and, consequently, can only be used against specific social processes, as a
means to repress and eliminate certain forms of social processes. That is, it can only
be used successfully as a potentially repressive policing instrument. It will then
share the fate of many other concepts deployed by central authorities in attempts to
‘control’ and ‘reduce’ escalating social diversity. ‘Integration’, ‘social stability’,
‘social cohesion’, and other widely used terms will almost inevitably become (or
have already become) targets of contestation and conflict, since they are irrelevant
as descriptors of the social realities. A monocentric understanding of legitimate
identities is likely to lead to coercive and excluding practices in the age of
globalization and superdiversity.
So how do we understand language policy in view of the evidence presented
here? It is clear that language policy, any language policy, is not a singular object,
the features of which can simply be ‘read off’ core documents and semantic analysis
of the core terms in the language-political vocabulary. It is best to see it as a highly
complex and non-linear set of practices that are lodged in specific sociolinguistic
contexts. The forces that create language-political effects are not unified either,
perhaps not even readily identifiable or entirely unpredictable. A more ethnograph-
ically-based analysis would bring out the specific factors influencing the direction of
these processes, and show us why sometimes coercion will prevail, and why
sometimes resistance and transformation occur.
It is also unwise to see language-political statements and key terms as descriptors
of sociolinguistic realities. This ‘fallacy of internalism’ (Thompson 1990) assumes
that political realities are contained in political texts, an assumption that has inspired
many scholars in language policy. Texts and terms, however, do not predict their
own uptake and implementation. In fact, uptake and implementation are fields of
research in their own right and require entirely different approaches than the critical
textual analysis of language policies. They demand ethnographic inspection; and
when such ethnographic inspection is performed, researchers will often encounter
unexpected outcomes (cf. McCarty 2011). We can then see formal language policies
—texts and their concepts—as flexible and unstable instruments; they may be in
design for dogmatic deployment but in reality receive defiant interpretations and
adverse consequences, as illustrated in this paper. We can also see formal language
policies as just one instrument for shaping the sociolinguistic lives of people; it
rarely occurs as the only instrument. Societies and their sociolinguistic environ-
ments are polycentric and become increasingly so. Language policies such as that of
X. Wang et al.
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harmony will therefore have to share their space of manoeuvering with other sets of
prescriptions and normative expectations.
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